Download Lectures on Biostatistics (1971).
Corrected and searchable version of Google books edition

Download review of Lectures on Biostatistics (THES, 1973).

Latest Tweets

Jump to Times Higher Education coverage

This is a longer version of comments published in the Times Higher Education Supplement, June 1, 2007. This longer version has now been printed in full in Physiology News, 69, 12 – 14, 2007 [download the pdf version].

It has now been translated into Russian.

Download pdf version of this paper.

I should make it clear that the term ‘bean counter’ is not aimed at accountants (we need good honest accountants). Rather it is aimed at a small number of senior academics and HR people who do not understand how to assess people.

How to get good science

David Colquhoun, Department of Pharmacology, University College London (May 2007).
email me

The aim of this article is to consider how a university can achieve the best research and teaching, and the most efficient administration.

My aims, in other words, are exactly the same as every university vice-chancellor (president/rector/provost) in the country.

Academics, like everyone else, are expected to do a good job. They are paid largely by taxpayers, and taxpayers have every right to demand value for their money. The problem is that it is very hard to measure the value of their output. Most of the ideas that have made life as comfortable as it is in the affluent West have their origins in science departments in universities, but it isn’t possible to place a monetary value on, say, James Clerk Maxwell ‘s equations of electricity and magnetism, or on Bernard Katz’s work on synaptic transmission, Still less is it possible to measure the contributions of A. E. Housman, Stanley Spencer or Augustus John (all UCL people, as it happens).

This paper describes one example of what happens when universities change from being run by academics to being run by managers. It describes an effect of corporatisation in the medical school of Imperial College London, but the same trends are visible in universities throughout the world. The documents on which it is based were sent to me after I’d written “All of us who do research (rather than talk about it) know the disastrous effects that the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) has had on research in the United Kingdom: short-termism, intellectual shallowness, guest authorships and even dishonesty (Colquhoun, 2007). The problem is not so much the RAE itself (the last one was done much better than the assessment described below), but rather it is the effect that the RAE has had on university managers, who try to shape the whole university in their misperception about its methods. It is another example of Goodhart’s law. The problem arises when people with little understanding of scholarship, or of statistics, attempt to measure numerically things that cannot be so measured. That is a plague of our age (Colquhoun, 2006), but it is a process loved by politicians, ‘human resources’ people and university managers.

Imagine how you would feel if you were sent every year a spreadsheet that showed your publication score and financial viability, and showed these things for all your colleagues too. Well, you may say, there’s nothing wrong with knowing how you are doing. But imagine too that your publication score is entirely automated, with no attempt to measure the quality of what you are doing. And imagine that if your grants don’t cover your costs, you are in danger of being fired. And imagine that your meetings with senior colleagues consist of harassment about what journals you publish in, and how many grants you have, not a discussion of your scientific aims. Not so good, you may think. But this is exactly what has been happening at Imperial College Medical School.

Let’s take a closer look at how academics are being assessed.

Imperial’s “publication score”

The publication score that appears alongside that of your colleagues is calculated thus.

Multiply the impact factor of the journal by the author position weight, and divide by the number of authors. The author position weight is 5 for the first and last author, 3 for the second author, 2 for the third author and 1 for any other position.

This index is clearly the invention of an uninformed incompetent. That is obvious for a start because it uses the impact factor. The impact factor is a (superfluous) way of comparing journals. It is the invention of Eugene Garfield, a man who has done enormous harm to true science. But even Garfield has said

“In order to shortcut the work of looking up actual (real) citation counts for investigators the journal impact factor is used as a surrogate to estimate the count. I have always warned against this use”. Garfield (1998)

Garfield still hasn’t understood though. As the examples below show, the citation rate is itself a very dubious measure of quality. Garfield quotes approvingly

“Impact factor is not a perfect tool to measure the quality of articles, but there is nothing better, and it has the advantage of already being in existence and is therefore a good technique for scientific evaluation.” (Hoeffel, 1998)

And you can’t get much dumber than that. It is a “good technique” because it is already in existence? There is something better. Read the papers.

Try asking an impact factor enthusiast why it matters that the distribution of citation numbers for a given journal is highly skewed, and you will usually be met with a blank stare. One effect of the skew is that there is no detectable correlation between impact factor and citation rate (see, for example, (Seglen, 1997; Colquhoun, 2003) . The easiest way to illustrate the numb-skulled nature of this assessment is with a few examples.

Publication score versus citation

Take a selection of 22 my own publications (the selection is arbitrary: it spans a range from 15 to 630 citations and omits some of the dross). Figure 1A shows that the well-known lack of correlation between citations and impact factor is true for me too. Figure 1B shows the same for the publication score.

Number of citations versus impact factor (log-log scales)

Number of citations versus “publication score” (log-log scales)

The highest publication score (77.3) was for a two page perspective in Science , with a mere 41 citations (Sivilotti & Colquhoun, 1995). As perspectives go, it was fine. But it seems that this was 7.2 times more valuable than my best ever paper (on which I was recently asked to write a classical perspective) which has a publication score of only 10.7 (but 565 citations) (Colquhoun & Sakmann, 1985). My lowest publication score (in this selection) is 2.08. That is for a Hawkes et al., (1992) , a mathematical paper which provides the method needed for maximum likelihood fitting of single channel recordings, without which most of my experimental work could not have been done; its mathematical difficulty may account for its modest number of citations (42) but its value for our work has been enormous after the maths was put into a computer program that can be used by the semi-numerate.

Citations versus value: a real life story

The dimwitted nature of the publication score, and also of using citation rates, can be illustrated in another way. Consider some of the background to a couple of examples; these are the real life facts that are ignored by bean counters.

Colquhoun & Sakmann (1981) got a score of 73.2 and 278 citations. It was a 3 page Nature letter, a first stab at interpretation of the fine structure of single channel openings. It wasn’t bad, but since Nature papers are so short they mostly can’t be thought of as real papers, and four years later we published the work properly in the Journal of Physiology (Colquhoun & Sakmann, 1985), the result of 6 years work (57 pages, 565 citations). For this Imperial would have awarded me a publication score of a mere 10.7.

Here is another interesting case. If we exclude chapters in Single Channel Recording ( Neher & Sakmann, 1983, 1995) which apparently don’t count, my most highly cited paper is Colquhoun, Neher, Reuter & Stevens (1981), This has 630 citations and a publication score of 36.6 for me, though only 14.6 for Harald Reuter. The reality behind this paper is as follows. In the early days of gigohm seal Harald Reuter decided that he wanted to learn the method, and to achieve this he invited three of us who already had some experience of the method to spend part of the summer vacation in Bern. We had a wonderful summer there, and being somewhat overmanned it was not very stressful. It would, I think, be fair to say that all four of us did much the same amount of work. While recording we noticed a type of channel that was opened by intracellular calcium, like the calcium-activated potassium channel that was already well known in 1981. This one was a bit different because it was not selective for potassium. We hadn’t expected to get a paper out of the vacation job but it seemed novel enough to write up, and 1982 being a year when anything with “single channel” in the title, however trivial, sailed into Nature, and because we had a limited amount of data, we sent it there. Because we had all contributed much the same amount of work, we put the authors in alphabetical order. The analysis of the results, such as it was, was crude in the extreme (paper charts unrolled on the floor and measured with a ruler). If we hadn’t seen this particular channel subtype, someone else would have done with a year or two. It just happened to be the first one of its type and so has been cited a lot, despite being scientifically trivial.

This example shows not only the iniquitous uselessness of the publication score used by the Imperial; it also shows dramatically the almost equal uselessness of counting citations.

How not to get Nobel prizes

Employees of Imperial medical school are told

The divisional minimum benchmarks are:

“To have sufficient papers in top rated journals in the speciality to ensure 4 publications in the RAE review period (2001-2007) with an Impact Factor of at least 5 and with no overlap with co-authors from ImperiaL”

The “productivity” target for publications is to:

“To publish 3 papers per annum including one in a prestigious journal with an impact factor of at least 5”

Unfortunately Dr X has published only two papers in 2006 . . .

Let’s see who lives up to their “productivity” criterion.

Take, for example two scientists who command universal respect in my own field, Erwin Neher and Bert Sakmann. They got the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1991. In the ten years from 1976 to 1985, Sakmann published an average of 2.6 papers per year (range 0 to 6).

In six of these ten years he failed to meet the publication target set by Imperial, and these failures included the years in which the original single channel paper was published (Neher & Sakmann, 1976) and also the year when Colquhoun & Sakmann (1985) was published. In two of these ten years he had no publications whatsoever.On the other hand, a paper in 1981 in a journal with an “unacceptable” impact factor of 3.56 has had over 15000 citations (Hamill et al. , 1981). This paper would have earned for Sakmann a publication score of a miserable 0.71, less than 100th of our perspective in Science . Bert Gottingen 1980

Sakmann in Göttingen, 1980. He and Neher did the work themselves.
(Picture from here)

All this shows what is obvious to everyone but bone-headed bean counters. The only way to assess the merit of a paper is to ask a selection of experts in the field.

Nothing else works.


It seems to have escaped the attention of bean-counters that this is precisely what has always been done by good grant giving agencies and search and promotion committees. Academics have always been assessed. But before HR departments and corporate-academics got involved, it was done competently. Now a whole branch of pseudo-science has appeared which devotes itself to trying to find ways of assessing people without bothering to find out what they have done. “Bibliometrics” is as much witchcraft as homeopathy. How long, one wonders, will it be before somebody coins the term ‘bibliomics’? (Oops, a Google search shows I’m too late, some numbskull has already done it).

How to get good science

Universities will have to decide what sort of science they want.

They can bend their policies to every whim of the RAE; they can bow to the pressures for corporatisation from the funding council.

Or they can have creative scientists who win the real honours.

They cannot have both.If they want to have the latter they will have to have universities run by academics. And they will have to avoid corporate and commercial pressures. They will have to resist the pressures to remove power from their best researchers by abolishing eminent departments and centralising power at a higher level. We have seen what this approach has done to the NHS, but it is a characteristic of the corporatising mentality to ignore or misuse data. They just know they are right.

It is also the box-ticking culture of managerialism that has resulted in approval of BSc degrees in anti-science (Colquhoun, 2007). Impressive sounding validation committees tick all the boxes, but fail to ask the one question that really matters: is what is being taught nonsense?

The policies described here will result in a generation of ‘spiv’ scientists, churning out 20 or even more papers a year, with very little originality. They will also, inevitably, lead to an increase in the sort of scientific malpractice that was recently pilloried viciously, but accurately, in the New York Times, and a further fall in the public’s trust in science. That trust is already disastrously low, and one reason for that is, I suggest, pressures like those described here which lead scientists to publish when they have nothing to say.

I wrote recently (Colquhoun, 2007) “All of us who do research (rather than talk about it) know the disastrous effects that the Research Assessment Exercise has had on research in the United Kingdom: short-termism, intellectual shallowness, guest authorships and even dishonesty”. Now we can add to that list bullying, harassment and an incompetent box-ticking style of assessment that tends to be loved by HR departments.

This process might indeed increase your RAE score in the short term (though there is no evidence that it it does even that). But, over a couple of decades, it will rid universities of potential Nobel prize winners.


Many of these papers are available from here

Colquhoun D (2003). Challenging the tyranny of impact factors. Nature 423 , 479 [download pdf].

Colquhoun D (2006). Playing the numbers game. A book review, of Does Measurement Measure Up? How Numbers Reveal and Conceal the Truth by John M. Henshaw. Nature 442 , 357.

Colquhoun D (2007). Science degrees without the science. Nature 446 , 373-374.

Colquhoun D, Neher E, Reuter H, & Stevens CF (1981). Inward current channels activated by intracellular calcium in cultured cardiac cells. Nature 294 , 752-754.

Colquhoun D & Sakmann B (1981). Fluctuations in the microsecond time range of the current through single acetylcholine receptor ion channels. Nature 294 , 464-466.

Colquhoun D & Sakmann B (1985). Fast events in single-channel currents activated by acetylcholine and its analogues at the frog muscle end-plate. J Physiol (Lond) 369 , 501-557.

Garfield E (1998) http://www.garfield.library.upenn.edu/papers/derunfallchirurg_v101(6)p413y1998english.html

Hamill OP, Marty A, Neher E, Sakmann B, & Sigworth FJ (1981). Improved patch clamp techniques for high resolution current recording from cells and cell-free membrane patches. Pflügers Arch 391 , 85-100.

Hawkes AG, Jalali A, & Colquhoun D (1992). Asymptotic distributions of apparent open times and shut times in a single channel record allowing for the omission of brief events. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 337 , 383-404.

Hoeffel, C. (1998) Journal impact factors [letter]. Allergy 53, 1225

Neher E & Sakmann B (1976). Single channel currents recorded from membrane of denervated frog muscle fibres. Nature 260 , 799-802.

Seglen PO (1997). Why the impact factor of journals should not be used for evaluating research. British Medical Journal 314 , 498-502. [Download pdf].

Sivilotti LG & Colquhoun D (1995). Acetylcholine receptors: too many channels, too few functions. Science 269 , 1681-1682.

Return to top

Editorial comment in THES

The Times Higher Education Supplement for June 1 2007, carried a front page article, a two page spread and an editorial, about the questions raised by the article above. (If you are not a subscriber you can sign ip for a two week free trial.)
I thought the editorial was particularly good. Here are some quotations from it.

Leader: Pointless targets threaten the best of researchers

Published: 01 June 2007

In the private sector, scarcely a day passes without some company announcing the steps it is taking to be more friendly to its employees.Even the most demanding city employers use the vocabulary of staff empowerment and talk about promoting work-life balance as a way of building staff commitment.But in higher education it seems that employers are taking an altogether tougher approach to those at the coalface. At Imperial College London and elsewhere they are assessing staff not as members of a scholarly community but based on a numerical analysis of their publications and their ability to bring in money..


In practice, universities may discover that telling the cleverest and most driven people how to run their professional lives is not likely to be a success. They will find ways of looking as if they are enthusiastic about change while continuing to work as they want to. And although talented academics like to work at top institutions, they also like to feel well treated. No university gets the best staff purely by offering good salaries. It tempts them with interesting work, good colleagues, the right facilities and the feeling that they are valued. Even world-famous institutions will become less attractive in the job market if they measure staff success in inappropriate ways.

The full text

Download the entire leading article (pdf file)

Download the front page article by Phil Baty.

Download pages 8 – 9. Article by Phil Baty, and shorter version of the paper above, plus a reply from Imperial. The reply was written by Steven Bloom who was behind Imperial’s cruel and silly use of metrics to fire people.

Print Friendly

32 Responses to How should universities be run to get the best out of people?

  • I agree to 99% with this paper, but it is 1% which I want to comment.

    The contemporary German academic system was founded by the brothers von Humboldt about 200 years ago. The idea was very simple but extremely effective: A king (or government) should only find a few outstanding researchers with clean reputation and brilliant records and give them a carte blanche. They, then, will automatically search for other peoples like themselves: intelligent, conscious, talented, unstained and truth-seeking. The only reliable criterion that X is a good scientist is the recommendation of Y and Z who are already known in that they are good scientists. The financial system should correspond to the same principles: From a certain level, a scientist should get enough money to not have to worry about the life’s difficulties; this salary should be independent of his formal performance, otherwise he would think on the formal performance rather than research. Even outstanding achievements should not further improve his financial status; otherwise, he would try to pursue money instead of Truth.

    It’s surprising but this simple system did work excellently up to 1933. During Nazi time, politics and ideology intervened the university life so that Jews and left-wing thinking people were replaced by those with ‘national feelings’. The problem was not that the latter were not Jews, or that they were Nazis (in fact, the huge majority of them was NOT), but that they were mediocre.

    The German science had not recovered form this first shock when the second one come in 1968. To become a professor, your research abilities was not important that time, but only your political views were. In 1933-1945, the selection criteria were purely white (German) origin, ‘national feelings’, and lack of contacts with Jews or socialists. In 1970-1980 (in some branches such as sociology, up to now), these criteria were political correctness and leftist thinking. Most importantly, both lists clearly do not include scientific excellence.

    But the principal criterion suggested by Humboldt is still valid! That is, the personal recommendation of established scientists decides the fate of the following generations of scientists. With the difference that the established scientists were, once, established on the basis of non-scientific criteria. Humboldt’s idea was that ‘a brilliant scientist will look for another brilliant scientist, and so on’. But a mediocre scientist is naturally looking for other mediocre scientists. In exact according with Humboldt, people recommend further those who are like themselves. Thus the mediocrity is now automatically maintaining mediocrity like earlier brilliance automatically maintained brilliance.
    The two shocks were further complicated by some natural circumstances. At Humboldt’s time, there were a few small universities with several hundreds of professors who taught a small number of students. Now there are hundred of universities and colleges (“Hochschulen”) whose task is to educate a good third of the German population. The criterion of personal recommendation (‘He is good, because I know that he is good, and you know that I am good’) cannot work in these conditions as it worked 200 or even 100 years ago. This is like Communism which can work, at least for some time, in groups of 100-200 people (Kibbuzim) but immediately fails in any large community.

    To summarise: You argue that the scientific community should be self-ruled rather than bureaucracy -ruled. Your arguments are convincing. Particularly as long as the academic self-rule still does its job. But when the chain is once broken, it does not work any longer.

  • Thank you very much
    This puts the matter perfectly, I think. UCL, founded in 1826, and the Humboldt University, Berlin, founded in 1810 share much in the ideals of their founders. They even look similar.

    Humboldt U Berlin

  • Dear David,

    Congratulations for your article in Physiology News, no. 69, 2007, p. 12 PN Soapbox. I agree with every sentence.

    Bert Sakmann

  • Thanks for your comment Bert. I just hope the people who decide on the next RAE will listen to your advice.

    Incidentally, just in case anyone is puzzled by the announcement that Bert Sakmann is moving to the University of Ulster, it should be pointed out that their news item is a piece of world class spin. He’s agreed to advise an ex-student of his, now in Ireland, on a computational project of mutual interest, after his move to Munich.

  • Dear David
    What an excellent article. I’ve long contended that [as far as the dreadful RAE is concerned], productivity [ie publications] should be
    DIVIDED, not MULTIPLIED, by the amount of grant money received – a view which Bob May [former President of the Royal Society, Lord May] privately shared.
    Charles Pasternak

  • Yes, there is a trend visible in the Universities worldwide which I like to call:

    “The Nobel Laureate Timeshare”.

    As Univs are pressured to have lots of outward signs that they are “world leading”, such as having Nobel Laureates on the staff, one or two bright sparks in Univ senior admin spotted the problem that there simply weren’t enough Laureates to go around. Not to mention their tendency these days to concentrate in a subset of (particular American) big rich research-intensive Univs.

    The imaginative solution developed to get around this was the “part time consulting Laureate”. These arrangements stretch from genuine part-time appointments for a certain number of months a year, to essentially honorary appointments which resemble company non-executive directors being supposed to turn up for a few days a year. Although to say this when Prof Bert won’t even be doing the work on their site sets new standards of DoubleSpeak. Well done Ulster!

    Anyway, having sealed the deal with your new Laureate, get the University PR dept to issue a hyperbolic press release, conveniently omitting to mention how many days a year of the Great Man or Woman’s you are getting and/or paying for, and your World ClassTMstatus is within touching distance.

    Triples and senior management team pay rises all round!

  • Good article.  Here’s an anecdote relevant to citation counts.

    Back in around 1982, trying to analyse some data, a colleague and I came up with an idea about curve-fitting to some data.  Since it wasn’t in the set of recipes in the textbook we had handy, I wrote it up, and a colleague suggested I submit it somewhere, which I did. This was TOTALLY unrelated to my research field (combinatorial mathematics), in which I was accumulating a respectable list of publications.

    I got a reply from the editor asking for further work to be done.  My attitude was that I knew nothing of this field beyond what was in the textbook (and this one idea which might or might not have some real value), and I wasn’t going to start learning about it.  So – too bad.

    I didn’t put it in quite those words, and the paper got accepted and published(!).

    I then went away for a year, and the admin folk in our group kept a list of reprint requests they had received for my articles in my absence.  This article was requested over a dozen times – all my others, some reasonably good, but in an unfashionable field, got 0 or 1 request each.

    So if you used reprint requests to judge articles, you’d totally misjudge the value of the work – it depends on how fashionable a field of research is.

Leave a Reply